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We study a two-person zero-sum game where each player chooses simulta-
neously a sequence of actions, and the payoﬀ is the average of a one-shot payoﬀ
over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game where
players are restricted to strategies implemented by ﬁnite automata. We study
the asymptotics of this value and a complete characterization in the matching
pennies case. We extend the analysis of this game to the case of strategies with
bounded recall.
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21 Introduction
The common assumption of perfectly rational agents has been questioned by several
papers in game theory and a whole literature was born, where players are subject to
some constraint in their ability to compute or to remember. Therefore only strategies
that are not computationally too demanding are available to them.
Bounds on players’ rationality can be expressed in diﬀerent forms. For instance
one stream of literature considers games played by ﬁnite automata (see, e.g., Ney-
man (1985, 1998); Rubinstein (1986); Abreu and Rubinstein (1988); Kalai and Stan-
ford (1988); Ben-Porath (1990, 1993); Neyman and Okada (2000b); Gossner and
Hern´ andez (2003, 2006); Gossner et al. (2003); Bavly and Neyman (2005)).
A partially diﬀerent stream of literature deals with players who can remember
only the most recent actions taken (see, e.g., Lehrer (1988, 1994); Sabourian (1998);
Gossner et al. (2003); Bavly and Neyman (2005); Renault et al. (2006)).
Other bounds on the complexity of the players have been considered, e.g., by
Neyman and Okada (1999, 2000a). This list is by no means exhaustive.
Many of the existing papers consider zero-sum games and study the eﬀect of
diﬀerent restrictions in the players’ rationality on the outcome of the game. Our
paper goes in this direction and deals with repeated two-person zero-sum games with
imperfect monitoring where the signal is trivial, that is, each player observes only her
own actions. This corresponds to playing a normal-form game where the two players
choose simultaneously an inﬁnite sequence of actions. We will consider only pure
strategies for the repeated game.
First we consider the above game played by automata, and we focus on the maxmin
of the game when the automata have diﬀerent size. The main result in this section is
that if player 1 is an automaton with size 2m and player 2 is an automaton of size m,
then player 1 can almost guarantee the value in mixed strategies of the stage game,
up to an error of order 1/m.
When the stage game is “matching pennies,” then an exact result can be obtained
for the above maxmin, for every possible size of the two automata.
Then we consider players with bounded recall. This model is much more com-
plicated to analyze than the one with automata. Only some results about match-
ing pennies are given. They show a counterintuitive nonmonotone behavior of the
maxmin of the repeated game, when the recall of the ﬁrst player is equal to the recall
of the second player plus one.
The proofs are based on some arithmetic arguments about periodic sequences. For
the model with bounded recall we use in addition some results on de Bruijn graphs
and sequences. These sequences have already appeared in some bounded rationality
models (see, e.g., Challet and Marsili (2000); Piccione and Rubinstein (2003); Liaw
and Liu (2005); Gossner and Hern´ andez (2006); Renault et al. (2006))
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 deals
with games played by automata. Section 4 studies games with bounded recall.
32 Oﬀ-line games
We start with a ﬁnite zero-sum game G = (A,B,g) where A,B are nonempty ﬁnite
sets and g : A × B → R. Player 1 chooses a ∈ A, player 2 chooses b ∈ B and the
payoﬀ g(a,b) is paid by player 2 to player 1.
In the associated oﬀ-line game Γ, player 1 chooses an A-valued inﬁnite sequence








where lim denotes a Banach limit, i.e. a linear mapping on the set of bounded
sequences such that liminf ≤ lim ≤ limsup. The use of a Banach limit (usual in
repeated games) will be immaterial in most of the paper since we shall deal mostly
with converging sequences.
We shall use the following notations throughout the paper. For a ﬁnite set A, we
let ∆(A) be the set of probability distributions on A. We use the same symbol for the
multilinear extension of g, i.e., given a two ﬁnite sets A,B, a function g : A×B → R







and we shall identify the degenerate distribution at a point x with the point x itself.






















For a nonempty ﬁnite set A, the set of A-valued sequences is denoted Aω. A
sequence x = (xt)t≥1 is n-periodic xt+n = xt for each t. A sequence is periodic if it is
n-periodic for some n ≥ 1. The set of all periodic sequences is denoted by S(A). For
each x in S(A), we let per(x) be the smallest n such that x is n-periodic. For each
n ≥ 1, we let Sn(A) be the set of periodic sequences x such that per(x) ≤ n, and
we let S0
n(A) be the set of n-periodic sequences, i.e. all sequences x such that per(x)
divides n.
4Let ∆n(A) be the set of probability distributions which are fractional in n, that
is µ ∈ ∆n(A) if for every a ∈ A, the value nµ(a) is an integer (with an abuse of
notation we write µ(a) instead of µ({a})). An n-periodic sequence x induces an







3 Oﬀ-line games played by automata
The main goal of the paper is to study the maxmin in pure strategies of the oﬀ-line
game, when players are restricted to boundedly complex strategies. A common way to
model bounded complexity is to consider strategies implemented by ﬁnite automata.
An automaton (say for player 1) is a tuple (Q,q1,f,h) where Q is a ﬁnite nonempty
set of states, q1 ∈ Q is an initial state, f : Q → A is the action function and h : Q → Q
is the transition function. An automaton generates a sequence of actions (xt)t≥1 as
follows:
x1 = f(q1), q2 = h(q1),...,qt+1 = h(qt), xt+1 = f(qt+1),
and so on. Since the set of states is ﬁnite, the sequences of states and of actions
generated by the automaton are eventually periodic (periodic from some stage on)
with period of length no more than |Q| (the cardinality of Q). In the oﬀ-line game
with the payoﬀ as in (2.1), the transient phase of the automaton is irrelevant: given
an eventually periodic sequence of actions for player 1, modifying ﬁnitely many terms
to make it periodic does not change the payoﬀ. So, without loss of generality, we may
view the automaton as a periodic sequence. Conversely, note that any sequence of
actions with period n can be played by an automaton with n states. We thus identify
the set Sn(A) with the set of strategies induced by automata with no more than n






which is the best payoﬀ that player 1 can guarantee with an automaton with at most
n states against player 2, whose automaton has at most m states.
Clearly, if n ≤ m, then Vn,m(G) = v(G). Furthermore Vn,m(G) is non-decreasing in n
and non-increasing in m.
3.1 Properties





y∈Bω γ(x,y) = v(G).
5In fact, if we ﬁx a sequence x of player 1, player 2 may choose a sequence y such that for
each stage t, yt minimizes g(xt,b) over b ∈ B. Thus, supx∈Aω infy∈Bω γ(x,y) ≤ v(G).
On another hand if player 1 plays constantly an action a that maximizes minb∈B g(a,b)





γ(x,y) = v(G). (3.1)
Moreover, by playing ﬁnite support mixed strategies in Γ, both players guarantee
val(G). Player 1 (resp. player 2) guarantees val(G) by drawing an action at random
according to an optimal mixed strategy in G and playing constantly the selected
action.
The main objects of our study are maxmin values in pure strategies. Player 2 can
defend the value of the game with constant strategies. Formally, for each x ∈ Aω,
there exists y ∈ S1(B) such that γ(x,y) ≤ val(G). To see this, let x ∈ Aω. For each













Let µx(a) = limt µx,t(a), where lim is a Banach limit (the usual limit may not always
exist). Since lim is linear, this deﬁnes µ ∈ ∆(A) such that γ(x,y) = g(µ,b). If
player 2 chooses b that minimizes g(µ,·), then γ(x,y) ≤ val(G).
Therefore for each n,m, v(G) ≤ Vn,m(G) ≤ val(G).
The next theorem states that the distance between V2m,m(G) and val(G) is of
order 1/m. This shows that, to guarantee the fully rational solution of the game,
here the value, player 1 needs only to be twice more complex than player 2.




≤ V2m,m(G) ≤ val(G),
where kGk := maxb
P
a |g(a,b)|.
The key to this theorem is to prove that when player 1 chooses a sequence with
period n, player 2 has a best reply whose period divides n. In particular, when
player 1 chooses a sequence with a prime period, the best that player 2 can do is to
respond by a constant sequence. Hence, when player 2 has complexity m, player 1
with complexity 2m may choose a prime period p such that m < p < 2m, and
guarantee the value of the stage game up to 1/m.
6We turn now to the formal proof of Theorem 3.1. We start by studying the problem
of computing a best reply of player 2 within Sm(B) against a periodic sequence x ∈
S(A). Fix thus such a sequence x with per(x), and an integer m. In the sequel
we let p = gcd(n,m) (the greatest common divisor of n and m), and q = lcm(n,m)
(the least common multiple of n and m). We consider the problem of ﬁnding an
m-periodic, B-valued sequence y that minimizes the average of g over a joint period


















The n-periodic sequence x is the repetition of a word of length n with letters in
A, which is denoted ˜ x = (x1,...,xn). Likewise, we write ˜ y = (y1,...,ym). There
are two integers u,v such that q = un and q = vm, so that within a period of the
bivariate sequence (x,y), ˜ x is repeated u times and ˜ y is repeated v times. For each
j ∈ {1,...,m}, we consider the xi’s that yj meets in the sequence (x,y), that is we
consider {xj+tm : t ∈ N}, and we look at the indices of these xi’s within a period of x.
For each integer t ∈ Z, let [t]n be the smallest positive element of the class of t
modulo n, that is [t]n ∈ {1,...,n} and t − [t]n is a multiple of n. We let for each
j ∈ {1,...,m},
Tn,m,j = {[j + tm]n : t ∈ Z}.




























one just has to choose yi that minimizes g(µx,m,j,b) over b ∈ B.
Lemma 3.2. For every sequence y ∈ S0
m(B), and every pair of indices j,j0 ∈
{1,...,m}, we have:
[j]p = [j
0]p =⇒ Tn,m,j = Tn,m,j0,
with p = gcd(n,m).
7Proof. Assume [j]p = [j0]p, i.e. j0 = j + kp for some integer k. Let i ∈ Tn,m,j0. Then
there exists two integers s,t such that
i = j
0 + tm + sn = j + kp + tm + sn.
From Bezout’s identity (see e.g. Jones and Jones (1998)) there exist two integers c,d
such that p = cn + dm. It follows that
i = j + (kc + s)n + (kd + t)m,
and thus i ∈ Tn,m,j. The conclusion is obtained by symmetry.
Lemma 3.2 shows that if two letters in ˜ y have the same rank modulo p = gcd(n,m),
then they meet the same set of letters of the sequence x. At optimum, these two letters
can be chosen to be the same and thus y can be chosen p-periodic.











has a solution y such that per(y) divides per(x).










has a solution y such that per(y) divides per(x).
We may now prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Given (3.1), it is enough to prove that there exists x ∈ S2m(A)
such that, for each y ∈ Sm(B),




Bertrand’s postulate, ﬁrst proved by Chebyshev, states that for every integer
m ≥ 2, there exists a prime number p such that m < p < 2m (see e.g., Nagell
(1964)).




















There exists a sequence x such that per(x) = p and µx = µp. To show this, it is
enough to order the action set A = {a1,...,aK} and play in sequence a1, pµp(a1)
times, ..., aK, pµp(aK) times. From Corollary 3.3, a best reply of player 2 , i.e. a
sequence that achieves miny∈Sm(B) γ(x,y), can be chosen such that per(y) divides p.
As p is prime, then per(y) = 1, that is y is constant (say equal to b) and γ(x,y) =
g(µp,b). Thus, miny∈Sm(B) γ(x,y) = minb g(µp,b) which completes the proof.
We use now the previous construction to prove that there exists a sequence of
player 1 which guarantees val(G) against any periodic sequence of player 2.
Proposition 3.4. There exists x ∈ Aω such that for each y ∈ S(B), γ(x,y) ≥ val(G).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We construct x∗ ∈ Aω such that for each y ∈ S(B), γ(x∗,y) ≥
val(G). Let (pn)n denote the sequence of prime numbers. For each n, denote by
xn ∈ Apn a word generating a sequence x with smallest period pn and µx = µpn where
µpn is, as above, a (1/pn)-approximation of an optimal mixed strategy of player 1.
Such a word was just constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
The sequence x∗ is constructed by concatenating those words. For all n ≥ 1, call
superword and denote ˜ xn the repetition of xn, (pn − 1)! times. Then ˜ xn has length
Nn := (pn)!. Choose then a sequence of integers kn such that
Nn+1
knNn
→ 0, as n → ∞. (3.3)
The sequence x∗ is such that ˜ x1 is repeated k1 times, ˜ x2 is repeated k2 times, ..., ˜ xn
is repeated kn times, and so on.
Let y ∈ S(B), set u = per(y). For k large enough, pk > u, hence u divides
pk!. Since ˜ xk has length pk!, we have that y and ˜ xk have pk! as common period. The
average payoﬀ over this period is thus the one yielded by y and the periodic repetition
of ˜ xk. Denote this payoﬀ γ(˜ xk,y). As pk is prime and u > pk, the best payoﬀ that y
can achieve against ˜ xk is minb g(µpk,b). Thus,




Therefore, if we let γk be the average payoﬀ yielded by the k-th superword against
y, we have liminf γk ≥ val(G). Condition (3.3) ensures that the length of a superword
is negligible with respect to the sum of the lengths of all the preceding superwords.







is the limit of the C´ esaro average of the (γk)k, which yields, γ(x,y) ≥ val(G).
93.2 Matching pennies played by automata






The value of this game is 1/2 and each player has a unique optimal mixed strategy









and P(n,m) = +∞ if there is no such p.
For instance, if n ≤ m, then P(n,m) = 1. If m < n = 2k, then P(n,m) = +∞. If n
is prime and n > m, then P(n,m) = +∞.







Again we use the fact that when choosing his best reply, player 2 may choose a
period that divides the period n of player 1. The key argument is as follows. Assume
that n = pq with p odd, and that player 2 chooses a sequence with period q. Then
each letter of player 2 faces a distribution of actions of player 1 which is fractional in
p. Such a distribution must depart from the optimal strategy (1/2,1/2) by at least
1/2p. We turn now to the formal proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Here A = {T,B} and B = {L,R}.
























If k ≤ m, this formula holds, as P(k,m) = 1 and wk,m = 0, since we can choose
y = x. From now on, assume k > m. We consider two cases.
Case 1: P(k,m) < +∞.





We ﬁrst show that for every x in S0








Let x in S0
k(A) and let y be an `-periodic sequence induced by the word ˜ y =
(y1,...,y`). The joint period of (x,y) is then k, and the word ˜ y is repeated p times.
Each yj meets thus p letters xi, and for each j, µx,`,j ∈ ∆p(A), where µx,`,j is deﬁned









A probability distribution µ ∈ ∆p(A) has the form
































Therefore, for the chosen y, (3.5) holds. We construct now x ∈ S0
k(A) such that for








By deﬁnition p is an odd divisor of k, and as k > m, p > 1. We let k = Cp for
some integer C, and p = 2d + 1 with d a positive integer. Let then x be the periodic
sequence generated by the word
˜ x = (x1,...,xk) = T ...T | {z }
Cd times
B ...B | {z }
C(d+1) times
.
We claim that for this x, miny∈Sm(B) γ(x,y) is achieved by the sequence which is










11Let y that achieves this minimum. From Lemma 3.2, we may assume that u := per(y)
divides k, so there is an integer D such that k = Du. Since u ≤ m < k, we have
D ≥ 2. Let (y1,...,yu) be the word generating y, we claim that each letter yj meets
more B’s than T’s so at optimum, each yj must be chosen equal to L.
For each j ∈ {1,...,u}, yj appears at stages j + tu, t = 0,...,D − 1. We just
need to check that less than half of these dates are before the time of the last T, i.e.
we check that,


















which completes the proof in this case.
Case 2: P(k,m) = ∞.
In this case k has the form k = p2j with p odd and j nonnegative integer such
that k/p = 2j > m. We need to prove that wk,m = 1/2. As wk,m ≤ 1/2, we prove
that there exists x ∈ S0
k(A) such that for each y ∈ Sm(B), γ(x,y) ≥ 1/2.
Consider then the sequence x with per(x) = 2j induced by the word of length 2j
T ...T | {z }
2j−1 times
B ...B | {z }
2j−1 times
.
Given this sequence x, miny∈Sm(B) γ(x,y) is achieved by y such that per(y) divides
2j, and since m < 2j, per(y) = 2` with ` ≤ j − 1. Thus the period of y divides 2j−1,
and each letter in y meets as many T’s and B’s. Thus γ(x,y) = 1/2.
The following is obtained directly from Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.6. (a) If n ≤ m, then Vn,m(G∗) = 0.
(b) For each N and m < 2N, V2N,m(G∗) = 1/2.
(c) For each m, V2m,m(G∗) = 1/2.
Proof. (a) This is immediate.
(b) If n = 2N for some N, then n has no odd divisor other than 1. Hence, for m < n,
P(n,m) = +∞ and Vn,m(G∗) = 1/2.
(c) For each m ≥ 1, there is a unique N ≥ 1 such that 2N−1 ≤ m < 2N and thus
m < 2N ≤ 2m. Thus in the formula for V2m,m(G∗), choose k = 2N ≤ 2m.
124 Oﬀ-line games with bounded recall
Another commonly used measure of complexity of strategies is the recall, that is the
number of past values of the sequence on which the next value depends.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Given an nonempty ﬁnite set A, a sequence x ∈ Aω has recall k ∈ N
if there exists a mapping f : Ak → A such that for each t > k, xt = f(xt−1,...,xt−k).
Such a sequence x is eventually periodic. As for automata, the transient phase
is irrelevant for our purposes, so we let Mk(A) be the set of periodic sequences with
recall k. For a sequence x ∈ Mk(A), we have per(x) ≤ |A|k. However, there are
sequences with period |A|k which are not of recall k. Take for example the sequence
T ...T | {z }
2k−1 times
B ...B | {z }
2k−1 times
.
Although of period 2k, this sequence does not have recall k, otherwise the k last T’s
should be followed by a T (assuming 2k−1 > k).
In this section we study the maxmin value of the oﬀ-line game where players are






As in the previous section, if j ≤ k, then Wj,k(G) = v(G). Moreover Wj,k is non-
decreasing in j and non-increasing in k.
4.1 Matching pennies with bounded recall
Since the analysis of oﬀ-line games with bounded recall is signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult,
we concentrate on the matching pennies game G∗ deﬁned in (3.4). The proofs of our
result shall use the tools of the previous section and the theory of de Bruijn graphs
(see, e.g., de Bruijn (1946) and Yoeli (1962) for some properties of these graphs).
Deﬁnition 4.2. A directed graph Dk called a de Bruijn graph if
• the set of vertices of Dk is {T,B}k,























































Figure 1. de Bruijn graph D3
Consider player 1 with recall k. The set of possible recalls for player 1 is {T,B}k. If
the recall is the word x ∈ {T,B}k at some stage, the recall at the next stage is obtained
by deleting the ﬁrst letter of x and adding a new letter after x. If x = (x1,...,xk),
the next recall is either (x2,...,xk,T) or (x2,...,xk,B). This deﬁnes a de Bruijn
graph.
A sequence with recall k (for player 1) can the be viewed as a cycle in the de Bruijn
graph Dk. Since Dk has 2k vertices, the longest cycle has length 2k. Since each vertex
has as many outgoing as ingoing edges, such a cycle, called Hamiltonian cycle, exists
(see, e.g., Bollob´ as (1998)). The associated sequence of Ts an Bs is called a de Bruijn
sequence. A cycle of length 1 also exists (associated to the constant sequence TTT ...),
but, more generally, the following proposition (Yoeli (1962)) shows that every length
cycle is possible (see Lempel (1971) for a generalization to any ﬁnite alphabet).
Proposition 4.3. For every p in {1,...,2k}, there exists a cycle with length p in the
de Bruijn graph Dk.
The next lemma provides results similar to those obtained for automata.
Lemma 4.4. (a) For every pair of integers (j,k), 0 ≤ Wj,k(G∗) ≤ 1/2.
(b) If j ≤ k, Wj,k(G∗) = 0.
(c) For every k, W2k,k(G∗) = 1/2.
In Corollary 3.6 (c) player 1 can induce a period whose maximum length is twice
the maximum length of the period induced by player 2. In Lemma 4.4 (c) player 1’s
maximum possible period is of length 2(2k), which is exponentially larger than the
length of player 2’s maximum possible period 2k. Hence here, in accordance with
known results on zero-sum games with bounded complexity (see Lehrer (1988), Ben-
Porath (1990)), if player 1 is exponentially more complex than player 2, then she
behaves like a fully rational player.
14Proof of Lemma 4.4. (a) This follows from Proposition 3.4 as a constant sequence
has recall 0.
(b) As before, if player 2 can use the same sequences as player 1, he can match at
every stage.
(c) If j = 2k, player 1 can choose the 2k+1-periodic sequence x whose cycle is
T ...T | {z }
2k times
B ...B | {z }
2k times
.
Note that such x has indeed recall 2k. Each sequence y ∈ Mk has period per(y) ≤
2k < per(x). It follows then from the proof of Theorem 3.5, that for each such y,
γ(x,y) = 1/2.
The main concern of this section is the study of Wk+1,k(G∗).
Theorem 4.5. (a) W1,0(G∗) = W2,1(G∗) = 1/2, W3,2(G∗) = 3/7,
(b) limk Wk+1,k(G∗) = 1/2.
Point (a) may suggest that the sequence Wk+1,k(G∗) decreases away from 1/2, the
intuition being that the advantage of having one extra slot of recall vanishes as k
grows. Point (b) shows that it is not so.
Piccione and Rubinstein (2003, Section 5, Footnote 5) noticed that if player 1
plays a de Bruijn sequence of recall k + 1, then player 2 with recall k must “have a






Our result shows that for large values of k, if player 1 plays a de Bruijn sequence
of recall k + 1, then player 2 with recall k has a frequency of mistakes close to 1/2.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. (a) Applying point c of Lemma 4.4 for k = 0 and k = 1 gives
W1,0(G∗) = W2,1(G∗) = 1/2. We prove now that W3,2(G∗) = 3/7. We ﬁrst show that
W3,2(G∗) ≥ 3/7.
Let x be the 3-recall strategy for player 1 that plays the 7-periodic sequence
TTTBBTB TTTBBTB .... Any strategy y with recall 2 for player 2 has a period
per(y) ≤ 4 = 22. From Theorem 3.5, the best sequence for player 2 can be chosen
with a period that divides 7, thus with period 1. As the proportions of T’s and B’s
are respectively 4/7 and 3/7, the best payoﬀ that player 2 can get is 3/7.









We have P(1,4) = P(2,4) = P(3,4) = P(4,4) = 1, P(5,4) = 5, P(6,4) = 3 and
P(7,4) = 7. Thus V7,4(G∗) = 3/7. This means that within the set of sequences with
15recall 3, player 1 cannot do better than 3/7 with a sequence x such that per(x) ≤ 7.
With recall 3, player 1 can play 8-periodic sequences but, up to circular permutations,
there is only one such sequence which is the de Bruijn sequence,
BBBTBTTT BBBTBTTT ....
But then, player 2 with recall 2 may play the 4-periodic sequence LLRR LLRR....
The payoﬀ is here 2/8 = 1/4 < 3/7.
(b) By Bertrand’s postulate, for each k there exists a prime number p such that
2k < p < 2k+1. By Proposition 4.3, there exists a p-periodic sequence of T’s and B’s
that corresponds to a strategy with recall k + 1. This deﬁnes x in Mk+1(A). As p
is prime, the best sequence that player 2 may choose among S2k(B) and thus among
Mk(B) is a constant sequence.





















and we just need to check that it is close to 1/2 when k is large. We assume w.l.o.g.
T(x) ≥ B(x) and evaluate B(x).
For each i ≥ k+2, denote by ui = (xi−1,...,xi−(k+1)) the recall of player 1 before
stage i, and denote by B(ui) = |{j ∈ {i−(k +1),...,i−1},xj = B}| the number of

















The point is that uk+2,uk+3,...,up+k+1 are distinct elements of {T,B}k+1, and p > 2k,
so more than half of the words in {T,B}k+1 appear in this average.
• Assume ﬁrst k even: k = 2a, with a in N. Then half of the words in {T,B}k+1
contain more T’s than B’s, and we get a lower bound by selecting the p elements with
fewer B’s. Better, we consider even less elements by taking average over the 2k = 22a



























(` − 1)! (2a + 1 − `)!


































So for k even,
B(x)
p










































































go to zero as a goes to inﬁnity.
4.2 Same recall, more actions
To conclude the paper, we present an example showing that, in games with bounded
recall, the complexity of the player may not be conveniently measured by the size of
17her recall. Consider the following game G∗∗. It is a variation of matching pennies






Proposition 4.6. Wk,k(G∗∗) = 1/2 for each k ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. With recall k, player 1 can play the following 2k+1-periodic
sequence: ﬁrst play a de Bruijn sequence on the alphabet {T1,T2} (of length 2k)
followed by a de Bruijn sequence on the alphabet {B1,B2}. With recall k, player 2
cannot produce a period greater than 2k, and as the best reply has a period that
divides 2k+1, player 2 cannot get more than 1/2.
Proposition 4.6 suggests that the actual power of player 1 with recall k depends
on her number of actions.
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